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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                  
 
No. 10-1091  
__________ 
                     
HEATHER SEIBERT, 
 
                                     Appellant. 
 
      v. 
 
LUTRON ELECTRONICS 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 3-08-cv-05139) 
District Judge:  Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel 
________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 4, 2010 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: November 24, 2010) 
                        
___________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
___________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Heather Seibert appeals the order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting Lutron Electronics’s Motion for Summary 
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Judgment.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
I.  Background and Procedural History 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only briefly revisit the facts 
and procedural history here.  Seibert began working for Lutron in 1996 as a part-time 
summer employee and began working as a full-time employee in June of 1997 in 
Lutron’s Technical Assistance Program.  Although Seibert received promotions and 
raises, she began to receive complaints about her work attendance as early as 1999. 
 Seibert began suffering from symptoms of depression in 2005.  She requested a 
leave of absence in May for her depression, which was granted.  After her return to work 
on October 6, 2005, Seibert told her counselor that she was no longer experiencing 
symptoms of depression.  In January of the following year, Dr. Liaw, Seibert’s physician, 
submitted a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) notice to Lutron explaining that 
Seibert continued to suffer depression, which would continue for an indefinite period of 
time, that she was taking medication and receiving counseling, and that she might miss 
work ―2 or 3 days once a month‖ due to her symptoms.  Seibert missed 70 days of work 
between January and July of 2006. 
 In July of 2006, Seibert requested – and was granted – maternity leave.  She 
returned to work on October 6, 2006, without any restrictions.  While on maternity leave, 
Seibert was informed that she had exhausted her FMLA time and was ineligible for more 
leave until she accumulated a certain number of work hours.  Upon Seibert’s return, 
Lutron reiterated the importance of her regular attendance in a document entitled 
―Conditions of Heather Seibert’s Return to Work—October 2, 2006.‖  Consistent with 
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Lutron’s ―cross-training‖ program, Seibert was rotated out of her position as a 
documentation specialist and into a position as an inventory control specialist.  She was 
also asked to train a male employee in the documentation specialist position.  That same 
male employee was asked to train an incoming female documentation specialist when he 
rotated out of the position.   
 Seibert’s absences continued.  Between January and March of 2007, Seibert 
missed seven full days and three half days, seven of which she attributed to caring for her 
children, not depression.   In violation of Lutron’s absentee policy, Seibert marked these 
absences as ―vacation days.‖  On March 23, 2007, a Human Resource specialist at Lutron 
indicated to Seibert that her absences were causing problems for her department and had 
prevented her from obtaining the necessary professional development.  Seibert was 
offered the choice between termination and resignation and chose the latter.  
 Seibert filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) on July 24, 2007, and another with the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission (PHRC) on July 26, 2007, alleging discrimination based on sex 
and disability.  
 Seibert filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County.  On 
October 8, 2008, Lutron removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the case proceeded to discovery.  At the close of 
discovery, Lutron moved for summary judgment on all of Seibert’s claims.  The District 
Court granted Lutron’s motion.  This appeal followed. 
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II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting summary 
judgment and apply the same standard that the district court should have applied.  Farrell 
v  Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate ―if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖  Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 
765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).   
III.  Discussion 
A.  Seibert Was Not Disabled Under the ADA 
The first issue is whether, drawing all inferences in favor of Seibert, the District 
Court correctly determined that no reasonable factfinder could conclude from the record 
that Seibert was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).  Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).  The ADA defines a 
disability as (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of an individual; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being 
regarded as having such an impairment.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).  Transitory, 
temporary or impermanent impairments are not considered an impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity.  See Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 
380 (3d Cir. 2002);  McDonald v. Com. of Pa., Dep’t. of Public Welfare, Polk Center, 62 
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F.3d 92, 94-97 (3d Cir. 1995).  Here, the record demonstrates that Seibert’s depression 
was not permanent, but instead was induced by specific, non-recurring events and thus 
was not a disability under the ADA.  
Even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Seibert, a reasonable 
jury would conclude that her depression was temporary and thus not a disability within 
the meaning of the ADA.  See, e.g., Ogborn v. United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union, 305 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2002); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 
16 (1st Cir. 1997).  Therefore, it was proper for the District Court to grant Lutron’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Seibert’s disability discrimination claim.   
B.  Seibert Failed to Exhaust Her Regarded-As Disabled Claim 
The second issue is whether the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment on Seibert’s regarded-as claim because she failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies as required.  A disability discrimination plaintiff must exhaust her 
administrative remedies by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC before filing 
a civil suit.  Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984).  The facts alleged in 
Seibert’s EEOC filing could not reasonably support a claim that Lutron discriminated 
against her because it wrongly perceived her as disabled.  The District Court properly 
determined that Seibert failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to this subset of 
her disability discrimination claim and granted summary judgment on Seibert’s regarded-
as claim.  
C.  Summary Judgment on Seibert’s Remaining Claims Was Proper  
The final issue is whether the District Court properly granted Lutron’s Motion for 
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Summary Judgment because Seibert failed to point to evidence sufficient to establish the 
existence of the elements of her gender discrimination claim.
1
  The District Court granted 
Lutron’s Motion for Summary Judgment because Seibert provided no specific evidence 
to support her claim that she suffered an adverse employment action when Lutron 
assigned her to a new position and replaced her with a male employee.  Seibert’s transfer 
was consistent with Lutron’s ―cross-training‖ rotation of employees.  Seibert’s transfer, 
moreover, was not met with a reduction in compensation, did not alter her employment 
rights, and did not affect her seniority level.  Thus, she has not met her burden of 
demonstrating that her transfer was adverse by providing evidence that the transfer 
―denied [her] of any employment opportunity or altered any employment rights.‖  
Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (E.D. Pa. 2000).   
Finally, the District Court concluded, and we agree, that there is no record 
evidence to support Seibert’s contention that Lutron’s explanation for her transfer was a 
pretext for discrimination.  Because Seibert has failed to demonstrate that her transfer 
constituted an adverse employment action, Seibert cannot set forth a prima facie case of 
gender discrimination. 
                                                 
 
1Seibert’s PDA claim fares no better.  Seibert alleged that she requested, but was 
denied, accommodation in the form of a reclining chair.  Because this allegation was not 
asserted in Siebert’s EEOC charge, she has failed to preserve her claim and it must 
therefore be dismissed.  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d).  Seibert raised new claims in her 
response to Lutron’s Motion for Summary Judgment that she was ―singled out and forced 
to use her vacation time simply because she was having post natal problems with her 
twins.‖  Even if these claims were timely raised, they lack merit.  See Piantanida v. 
Wyman Center, Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that post-natal childcare 
duties are not within the protections afforded by the PDA). 
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IV.  Conclusion  
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
